Behavioral learning game for socio-physical IoT connections by unknown
Kim EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:24 
DOI 10.1186/s13638-016-0521-8RESEARCH Open AccessBehavioral learning game for socio-physical
IoT connections
Sungwook KimAbstract
Game theory is an innovative idea to understanding human behaviors from economics to political science.
However, due to the bounded rationality of game players, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior
and should complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. This paper provides a
foundation for decision-making process from the viewpoint of game theory and behavioral science approach. First,
we develop a new behavioral learning game model to examine how bounded rationality is exhibited in the game
player’s cognitive capabilities. Second, we apply the developed game model to operate the socio-physical Internet
of Things (IoT) system. Finally, we study how to effectively negotiate between players who, though interested in
their own welfare, are also willing to consider other players in the IoT system. The main contribution of our work
lies in the fact that we shed some new light on the interplay between the game player’s selfishness and the public
interest. We believe that our approach will open a new door to exploring the impact of social behavior on
networking.
Keywords: Behavioral learning game, Internet of Things, Bounded rationality, Behavioral learning equilibrium, Game
theory, Socio-physical connections1 Introduction
The rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) tech-
nology makes it possible for connecting various smart
objects together through the Internet and providing
more data interoperability methods for application
purpose. Typically, IoT is expected to offer advanced
connectivity of devices, systems, and services that
goes beyond machine-to-machine communications and
covers a variety of protocols, domains, and applica-
tions. The interconnection of these smart devices is
expected to usher in automation in nearly all fields
while reducing the need of human interventions. The
future vision of IoT has evolved due to a convergence
of multiple technologies, ranging from wireless com-
munication to micro-electromechanical systems. This
means that all traditional technologies have contribu-
tions to enable the IoT [1–3].
Recently, information cascades over IoT systems can
deeply influence the patterns of social behaviors. Indeed,
we have become increasingly aware of the fundamentalCorrespondence: swkim01@sogang.ac.kr
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license, and indicate if changes were made.role of the coupled socio-physical network as a medium
for the spread of information. Socio-physical approach
considers jointly the interaction and integration of the
social and physical views of IoT systems and yields
meaningful qualitative and quantitative differences when
compared with approaches that focus on the social and
physical views in isolation. During IoT system opera-
tions, this collaborative approach provides services to
both people and technical systems while realizing the vi-
sion of future pervasive computing environments [4, 5].
In IoT systems, individual devices locally make control
decisions to maximize their profits. This situation can be
seen a game theory problem. Game theory is a decision-
making process between independent decision-making
players as they attempt to reach a joint decision that is
acceptable to all participants. The standard application
of game theory requires each player to form a utility
function that quantifies the benefit that accrues to it as a
consequence of the actions that it and all other players
may take. In the traditional game theory, a solution con-
cept is a rule that defines what it means for a decision
vector to be acceptable to all players in the light of the
conflict/cooperation environment [6].uted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
y/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
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have complete information about the game situation
throughout the time period. Therefore, many game
models assume that players are on perfect rationality
and can have enough abilities to act according to their
preferences. However, this assumption is obviously not
satisfied under the real-world environment; experiments
have shown that players do not always act intelligently
[7]. In addition, traditional game methodologies attempt
to optimize individual player’s profit. However, the game
players’ group interest is generally not optimized and
perhaps not even well served if each individual player
optimizes his own behavior. This is because optimization
is an individual activity that is based on the doctrine that
each individual is committed to maximizing its own sat-
isfaction without concern for the welfare of others [8].
To overcome the limitations of traditional game the-
ory, behavioral science is a newly discovered research
approach. It is the idea that in decision-making, the ra-
tionality of individuals is limited by the information they
have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the fi-
nite amount of time they have to make a decision. In
real-world situations, decision-makers lack the ability
and resources to arrive at the optimal solution. Therefore,
the decision-makers are seeking a satisfactory solution
rather than the optimal one. It is an alternative way of
traditional optimal decision-making, which views decision-
making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal
choice given the information available. To understand the
complex social behavior, behavioral science has become
very popular and of growing interest in social sciences [9].
In this work, we develop a new behavioral learning
game model and also propose a novel solution concept.
To develop a new game model, we take into consider-
ation the bounded rationality of decision-makers in our
solution searching process. In addition, we draw on the
concept of selfishness and social welfare trade-offs. To
strike an appropriate performance balance between
contradictory requirements, the proposed game model
employs a learning perspective and investigates some of
the reasons and probable lines for justifying players’ be-
haviors. Therefore, the key feature of our model is a
real-world practicality. In contrast, traditional game as-
sumptions for perfectly optimal decisions are often not
feasible in practice.
A newly developed behavioral learning game involves
the idea that players take reasonable strategies that may
lead to suboptimal decision-making. Therefore, players
engage in mapping the decision strategies that players
use in order to help increase the effectiveness of
decision-making process. During the behavioral learning
game operations, players iteratively negotiate with each
other and adaptively modify their strategy selections in
an attempt to reach a mutually acceptable decisionvector. As a new solution concept of behavioral learn-
ing game, the observed agreement with behavioral de-
velopment is introduced. Such an agreement in
decision-making, if reached, is called behavioral learning
equilibrium. During game operations, game players may
not realize how their learning experience would have been
different if they had chosen to behave differently. There-
fore, they may adjust their behavior when experience con-
tradicts their beliefs. The novel solution concept of
behavioral learning equilibrium presents a dynamic learn-
ing interpretation to justify their behaviors.
Recently, IoT technology has been widely explored in
many fields. IoT is the interconnection of uniquely iden-
tifiable network agents or smart objects within the exist-
ing internet infrastructure. The rapid IoT development
makes it possible for connecting various smart objects
together through device-to-device communications and
providing more data interoperability methods for appli-
cation purpose [10]. However, there is much room left
to exploit diverse social interactive relationships among
agents for networking optimization, and it is of great
interest to explore the continuum space [11–13]. Moti-
vated by the facts presented in the above discussion, in
this paper, we design a new IoT communication control
scheme based on the behavioral learning game model.
With considering the socio-physical relationship, we take
into account both the agents’ social relationships and
physical coupling.
In the proposed scheme, a key observation is that net-
work agents are coupled not only in the physical domain
due to the physical relationship but also in the social do-
main due to the social ties among agents. Therefore,
under socially connected dynamic IoT environments, we
can formulate the agents’ payoff by the combination of a
personal utility and social group utility functions and
make agents select their strategies by considering the
interaction of selfishness and social welfare tradeoffs.
Based on the autonomous agent behaviors, the proposed
algorithm is implemented as a behavioral learning game
to approximate the behavioral learning equilibrium status.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we review the related work. In Section 3, we
familiarize the reader with the basics of behavioral learn-
ing game model and define the solution concept of behav-
ioral learning equilibrium. In Section 4, we explain in
detail the developed IoT system management algorithm
based on the behavioral learning game model. We present
the experimental results in Section 5 and compare the
performance to other existing schemes [5, 11]. Finally, we
give our conclusion and future work in Section 6.
2 Related work
Over the years, a lot of state-of-the-art research work on
the IoT system operation has been conducted. The
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[5] is a framework for addressing the interplay between
online social networks and communications by exploit-
ing principles from the theory of utility-based engineer-
ing and elements from social network analysis. To
improve the IoT system performance, the USPI scheme
aims at a holistic design model to allow the joint devel-
opment of improved resource management mechanisms.
This scheme provides a promising direction for improv-
ing the performance and dealing with various problems
emerging in both the social and communication parts of
networks, thus strengthening the emerging paradigm
shifts in the design of future IoT systems and applica-
tions [5].
The Social Group Utility Maximization (SGUM)
scheme [11] is developed for cooperative networking
that takes into accounts both social relationships and
physical coupling among network users. Instead of maxi-
mizing its individual utility or the overall network utility,
each user aims to maximize its social group utility that
hinges heavily on its social ties with other users in IoT
systems. The SGUM scheme provides rich modeling
flexibility and spans the continuum space between non-
cooperative game and network utility maximization [11].
All the earlier work has attracted a lot of attention and
introduced unique challenges to efficiently handle the
IoT communication control problem. However, these
existing schemes were one-sided protocols and cannot
adaptively respond the current IoT system conditions.
Therefore, they did not provide suitable solutions under
different practical constraints. Compared to these
schemes [5, 11], the proposed scheme attains better per-
formance during the IoT system operations.3 Behavioral learning game and behavioral
learning equilibrium
This paper presents a behavioral learning game; it is based
on a mathematically precise notion of negotiation between
selfishness and social welfare. Therefore, our game model
is fundamentally different from, and not an approximation
to, being individual optimization. Key attribute of our ap-
proach is that we naturally accommodate sophisticated so-
cial behaviors with practical assumptions and approximate
the ideal system status.3.1 Behavioral learning game model
To model strategic interactive situations involving learn-
ing process, we develop a new behavioral learning game.
In the developed game model, players seek to choose
their strategy practically. Based on their social relation-
ship, different players can receive different payoffs. We
make the following definition.Definition 1. A behavioral learning game model consti-




(i) N is a set of game players N = {p1,…, pn}
(ii)Sk ¼ sk1; sk2;…; skm
 
is a non-empty finite set of all
pure strategies of the player k where m is the num-
ber of possible strategies
(iii)Uk ¼ uk1; uk2;…; ukm
 
is the utility set of all payoffs
of the player k’s strategy; it is defined as a
satisfaction levels of players. U :S1  S2⋅⋅⋅ Sn → N
is the utility function where N represents the set of
real numbers.
(iv)φk = {φk1,…, φkn} is the set of each player’s social tie
strength with other players. We assume that each
player’s social tie strength to itself is normalized as
1, i.e., φkn = 1 and 0 ≤ φkj ≤ 1.
(v)Λε = {ε1,…, εn} is the set of each player’s cooperative
degree for the total system performance. It is an
indicator of non-cooperative actions for each player.
Behavioral learning game is constructed based on the
basic concept of “good enough” decisions. Therefore,
game players search for the optimal solution but termin-
ate the search when an option is deemed to be good
enough; it means that the outcome of selected strategy
meets or exceeds the player’s individual aspiration level.
Therefore, we replace a profit maximization as the self-
ish rationality in favor of a concept of adequacy as the
realistic approach. In real-world situations, this approach
is a practical decision-making mechanism with the infor-
mational and computational constraints.
Furthermore, behavioral learning game accounts simul-
taneously for cooperative and non-cooperative interests
during multi-agent decision-making process. According to
the social utility theory, game players can be assumed to
have two personas [8]. The non-cooperative persona views
the strategies exclusively in terms of maximizing his pay-
off, while the cooperative persona views the strategies ex-
clusively by considering the social relationship and public
interests. Based on these two personas, our behavioral
learning game formulates two important aspects of
sophisticated behavior; namely, selfishness and social
cooperation. To express sophisticated behaviors and real-
istically define utility functions, it would be more natural
approach. Therefore, the behavioral learning game model
may be synthesized according to a systematic concept of
bounded rational behavior that involves social utilities,
that is, utilities that account for the interests of others as
well as of the self.
The example of behavioral learning games can be an
electricity market model. Actually, the electricity market
faces much more uncertainties; the uncertainty comes
from the behavior of power suppliers which have different
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depends on suppliers’ level of rationality, which is related
to not only his information processing manner but also
his utility function. The objective of power demander is to
minimize the purchasing cost while facing the diversity of
the market. Obviously, it is reluctant to say that a trad-
itional game model with hyper-rationality has an ability to
predicate the power market correctly. Therefore, it is
more reasonable to take the behavioral game approach as
a solution for the electricity market model with the vari-
able level of rationality [14].
3.2 Behavioral learning equilibrium
In non-cooperative game models, Nash equilibrium is a
traditional solution concept. However, the main weak
point of Nash equilibrium is unrealistic assumption. In
the scenario of the Nash equilibrium, the players are as-
sumed to be perfectly rational. It requires complete in-
formation and a well-defined and static situation. In
reality, this assumption rarely holds [15]. When a player
faces unknown players and does not observe the individ-
ual players’ preferences, it is generally impossible to
reach the Nash equilibrium.
Since the development of the Nash equilibrium concept,
game theorists have proposed many related solution
concepts, like Pareto equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, ε-equilibrium,
correlated equilibrium, and Wardrop equilibrium [15].
These solutions refine the Nash equilibrium to overcome
perceived flaws in the Nash concept. However, subsequent
refinements and extensions of the Nash equilibrium share
the main insight of Nash’s concept. All equilibrium con-
cepts analyze what choices will be made when each player
takes into account the decision-making of others. There-
fore, all the various equilibria fundamentally have the
same limitations; (i) there are multiple equilibria in a
game. In many games, there is no guarantee for the
uniqueness of the equilibrium, (ii) game players are not
perfectly rational in many circumstances. Perfect national-
ity assumption is not applicable in real-world situations,
(iii) equilibria concept has mostly been developed in a
static setting. Therefore, traditional approach cannot cap-
ture the adaptation of players to change their strategies
and reach equilibrium over time, and (iv) equilibria con-
cept does not take computational costs—it needs huge
computational overheads [15, 16].
In this work, we introduce a new solution concept,
called Behavioral Learning Equilibrium (BLE). It is the
result of a learning process over repeated play, instead of
rational thinking on the player’s ability to find a static
equilibrium point. Therefore, players try to maximize
their satisfaction level through a repetitive learning
process. In addition, the BLE solution includes the con-
cept of mutual cooperation. If all players are satisfiedwhile maintaining a social welfare, the BLE can be ob-
tained. The BLE is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. BLE is a set of strategies that can be ob-
tained by repeating a symmetric game with receiving
feedbacks. When a set of strategies has chosen by all
players and all the cooperative degrees of players are
higher than a pre-defined minimum bound (Γ), this set
of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute
the BLE. That is formally formulated as
U :U1 U2⋯Un; s:t:; ui si; εið Þ∈U i; si∈Si and





s:t:; Γ < 1 and i∈N
ð1Þ
where Ui is the utility set of all consequent payoffs of
the player i’s strategy and Λε is the set of each player’s
cooperative degree. n is the number of game players.
BLE is the state where all players’ current cooperative
degrees are above the pre-defined minimum bound (Γ).
Therefore, the BLE is a strategy profile that approximately
satisfies the condition of perfect equilibrium (Γ = 1). In the
BLE, players have no incentives to deviate given their be-
liefs about the consequences of deviating. These beliefs
are consistent with the information obtained from the ac-
tual equilibrium play of all players.
In this work, we do not focus on trying to get an opti-
mal solution based on the traditional approach, but in-
stead, an adaptive online interactive model is proposed.
This approach can dramatically reduce the computa-
tional complexity and overheads. Usually, the traditional
optimal solutions need exponential time complexity.
However, the proposed solution concept only needs
polynomial time complexity. Even though the BLE solu-
tion does not guarantee the performance optimization,
our BLE concept can make this equilibrium possible in
real-world operations.
4 Socio-physical IoT management algorithm
Basically, IoT architecture can be considered as ubiqui-
tous ID architecture enhanced with concrete network
mechanisms using lightweight protocols for resource-
oriented applications. Usually, the IoT system is made
up of a number of PANs (personal area networks), which
comprise parts of the IPv6 network. In IoT systems,
there are different kinds of devices (e.g., IoT agents),
which are healthcare, home security, life-supporting ma-
chines, sensors, and so on. The information of the IoT
agents are considered essential and should be distrib-
uted, rapidly. Based on this information, IoT agents
know how they can work together in cooperation [17].
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rithm based on the behavioral learning game. The main
goal of our scheme is to ensure relevant tradeoff between
optimality and good enough. To practically adapt the IoT
system situation, IoT agents are assumed as game players.
Players have set of different packet transmission probabil-
ities, which are their strategies. Individual players do not
statically decide the best strategy. Instead, all possible
strategies can be chosen based on a player’s preference.
To induce selfish players to participate cooperative behav-
iors, the service cost is provided for the players. By using
the dynamics of feedback-based repeated process, the co-
ordinate entity (i.e., system operator) periodically monitors
the current IoT system situation and adaptively intervenes
to converge to the BLE. Based on the only local informa-
tion and an interactive learning technique, the play of the
different players is independent, and players adjust their
strategies. It leads to the entirely distributed implementa-
tion of the proposed algorithm.
Even though cooperative behavior may be desired of
multi-player game models, it would be rare indeed for
the interests of all players to be perfectly aligned. To
maximize social welfare, game players could have the
capability to consider other players and compromise in
all situations. Therefore, players must be able to negoti-
ate effectively and maintain their own interests while
yielding some considerations to others in the decision-
making mechanism. Such behavior requires each indi-
vidual to seek a social balance between its individual in-
terests and the interests of others [8].
4.1 Data transmission algorithm in IoT systems
To implement the proposed scheme, IoT agents are
grouped as a cluster with a contention-based medium
access communication mechanism. If there are n com-
munication agents, they are game players; the player
k (0 ≤ k ≤ n) contends for the opportunity of data trans-
mission with probability qk(i. e., qk ∈ Sk) in a time slot
where 0 ≤ qk ≤ 1. If a persistence mechanism is imple-
mented, the data transmission probability is just the
persistence probability. If multiple players contend in
the same time slot, a collision occurs and no player can
get the transmission opportunity. To define the utility
function for each player, we employ three different com-
ponents. From the viewpoint of self-interest, the indi-
vidual utility function of each player k(Θk(·)) is defined
as follows.
Θk qk ; q−k
  ¼ log ϱk  qk  Y








−C k; qk ; s:t:; q−k ¼ q1;…; qk−1; qkþ1;…qN 
ð2Þwhere ϱk represents the player k’s action willingness
(e.g., player k’s efficiency of utilizing the transmission op-
portunity). Traditionally, the logarithmic function is
widely used in literature for modeling utility of network
users. C k; qk  is the cost function for the player k with
probability qk. Thus, the individual payoff function
(Θk(·)) has a nice interpretation: the net gain of utility
from channel access decreases by the network cost.
In this work, the system operator monitors and coor-
dinates explicitly by adjusting the cost. During game op-
erations, the system operator periodically observes the
players’ behaviors and cooperative degree of each player.
Every time period (unit_time), the system operator dy-
namically adjusts the cost based on this measured infor-
mation. Therefore, the system operator can induce
players to cooperate each other as well as to take appro-
priate actions. In the proposed scheme, cost is obtained
based on the concept of fairness and cooperative degree.
To characterize this fairness notion, we follow the Jain’s
fairness index (ℱ), which has been frequently used to
measure the fairness of network resource allocations
[18]. Based on the ℱ and ε information, the player k’s
cost function C k; qk  is defined as follows.
C k; qk  ¼ 1þ ξð Þ  γk qk ; q−k
 Xn
i¼1 γ i q
i; q−ið Þ
 !ℱ
 log ϱk  qk 
Y










0 ; if εk > Γ









i¼1 γ i q
i; q−ið Þ 2 and i∈N
ð3Þ
where γk(q
k, q− k) is the amount of actually transmitted
data bits per unit_time for the player k, and the range of
ℱ is varied from 0 to 1. Therefore, if a player has a
higher fairness value (ℱ) and cooperative degree (ϵ), he
can reduce the C :ð Þ value.
In the proposed scheme, we consider that two
players are connected by a directed edge if one has a
social tie towards the other. Let Gk denote the group
of the player k; Gk is the set of players connected by
the player k. From the perspective of group, the
group utility function of Gk J k :ð Þ
 
is defined based
on the social relationships. The strength of the social
tie from player k to player i is quantified by φki where
0 ≤ φki ≤ 1. Each player k aims to maximize its J k :ð Þ ,
which is given by
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i¼1;i≠k
φki Θk qk ; q−k
   ð4Þ
where q− k is the probability set of players without the
player k. From the viewpoint of social cooperation, we
should consider the total performance of participating
players. Therefore, the social utility function of each
player k Tk :ð Þ  is defined as follows.
Tk qk ; q−k
  ¼ εk  X




By considering three different perspectives (i.e., individ-
ual utility (Θ), group utility (J ), and social utility (T)), we
can make possible comparisons of the selfish option in
contrast to the socially cooperative option. Finally, the




Θk qk ; q−k
 þ J k qk ; q−k þ Tk qk ; q−k  
ð6Þ
where εk is a weighted parameter for different ob-
jectives; it provides the evaluation of the relative
degree of achieving a social payoff. Under the di-
verse preference and uncertainty, players dynamic-
ally adjust ε value to adapt the preference of social
welfare.
4.2 The main steps of proposed algorithm
Recent developments in behavioral science have forced a
re-evaluation of the conventional concept of rationality
used in game theory. The traditional game model as-
sumes that game players are only involved in rational
decision-making. However, developments in the areas of
behavioral science have led to advancements in the mod-
eling and identification of bounded rationality in
decision-making [19]. In this study, game players indi-
vidually adjust their propensity and select a good enough
strategy based on the observation of past periods of
interactions.
By considering the interaction and social relation-
ship associating with the other players, each player
may choose the action. Traditional non-cooperative
game approach does not provide any guarantees of
socially balanced outcome. Achieving social balance
requires a concept of BLE that is more flexible and
accommodating than optimization. Therefore, it is a
relevant practical game solution. To achieve this BLE,
we construct a feedback-based control mechanism ac-
cording to iterative learning technique. In our learn-
ing technique, the solution exhibits that a better
strategy may be chosen without any sophisticatedprediction mechanism. To get an expected solution,
we develop the behavioral learning game procedure;
players change their current strategy based on their
preferences. The main steps of the proposed algo-
rithm are given next and described as a flow diagram
in Fig. 1.
Step 1: At the initial time, qk(·) is randomly decided
from the strategy set Sk. This starting guess
guarantees that players independently select their
packet transmission probability at the beginning of
the game.
Step 2: Control parameters Γ, ϱ, φ and ε are given from
the simulation scenario (refer to Tables 1 and 2). Based
on the social ties, each player has its own group G; it
can capture complex social structures among network
agents.
Step 3: Due to the current IoT system situation, each
player estimates his payoff (U(·)) according to (2), (3),
(4), (5), and (6).
Step 4: The cost for each player is estimated according
to fairness (ℱ) and ξ parameter. Based on the formula
in (3), ℱ and ξ values adaptively adjusted, and the cost
is obtained.
Step 5: During game processing, individual player
iteratively adjust their strategy (q and ε) to maximize
his payoff based on the equation (6).
Step 6: To reach a mutually acceptable solution, each
player repeatedly interacts with other and adaptively
learns the best solution.
Step 7: If all players ε values are above than Γ
i:e:;mini;1≤i≤n εijεi∈Λεf g > Γ
 
, it is assumed to get a
BLE; when the IoT system reaches the BLE, the game
process is temporarily stopped.
Step 8: Constantly, the system operator is self-
monitoring the current IoT system; proceed to step 3
for the next iteration.5 Performance evaluation
In this section, we compare the performance of our
scheme with other existing schemes [5, 11] and can con-
firm the performance superiority of the proposed ap-
proach by using a simulation model. Our simulation
model is a representation of the socio-physical IoT sys-
tem that includes system entities and the behavior and
interactions of those entities. To facilitate the develop-
ment and implementation of our simulator, Tables 1 and
2 lists the system parameters.
Our simulation results are achieved using MATLAB,
which is widely used in academic and research institu-
tions as well as industrial enterprises. In order to emu-
late a real-world scenario, the assumptions of our
simulation environment are as follows.
Fig. 1 Flow diagram for the proposed algorithm
Table 1 System parameters used in the simulation experiments
Traffic class Message application Bandwidth requirement (kbps) Connection duration average/s
I Delay-related applications 32 30 s (0.5 min)
II Event-related applications 32 120 s (2 min)
64 180 s (3 min)
III General applications 128 120 s (2 min)
256 180 s (3 min)
IV Multimedia applications 384 300 s (5 min)
512 120 s (2 min)
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Table 2 System parameters used in the simulation experiments
Parameter Value Description
n 10 The number of network agents (i.e., players)
m 5 The number of strategies (i.e., data packet transmission probability)
ϱ 1 The player’s action willingness for data packet transmission
Γ 0.05, 0.075, 0.1, 0.125, 0.15 Pre-defined minimum bound for cooperative degrees
φ 0 ≤ φ≤ 1 Each player’s social tie strength with another other player
ε 1 ≤ ε≤ 1 Each player’s cooperative degree for the total system performance
unit_time Second Length of equal intervals in partitioned time axis
PL 0.5 The social link exist probability in the SGUM scheme
wmn 1 The strength of social tie for each social link in the SGUM scheme
pf 1 Flow-related parameter in the USPI scheme
pn 1 User-related parameter in the USPI scheme
Kim EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:24 Page 8 of 11 The simulated system consists of ten network agents
(i.e., players) for the IoT system.
 The network agents are randomly scattered across a
square area of a length of 2000 m.
 In each network agent, a new service request is
Poisson with rate ρ (services/s), and the range of
offered service load was varied from 0 to 3.0.
 The proposed scheme and other existing schemes
[5, 11] are implemented in the same simulation
scenario, i.e., same network agents and offered
service load.
 For simplicity, we assume the absence of power
control problems in the experiments.
 The range of pre-defined minimum bound (Γ) is de-
cided from 0.05 to 0.15; Γ ∈ {0.05, 0.075, 0.1, 0.125,
0.15}.
 The number of strategies (m) for the player k is 5,
and each strategy ski;1≤i≤m
 
is ski ∈ {0.1,
0.3,0.5,0,7,0.9}.
 The strength of the social tie (φ) for other players is
randomly decided.
 The value of cooperative degree (ε) is varied, and it
is dynamically adjusted during the game operations.
 The resource of IoT system is bandwidth (bps), and
the total resource amount is 30 Mbps.
 Network performance measures obtained on the
basis of 50 simulation runs are plotted as a function
of the offered traffic load.
 The IoT performance is estimated in terms of the
resource usability, system throughput, cooperative
degree, and system fairness.
 The service size of each application is exponentially
distributed with different means for different
message applications.
Performance measures obtained through simulation
are normalized system throughput, resource usability,
the cooperative degree status under different Γ valuesand service fairness in IoT systems, etc. In this paper, we
compare the performance of the proposed scheme with
existing schemes: the USPI scheme [5] and the SGUM
scheme [11]. These existing schemes are also recently
developed as effective network management algorithms.
Figure 2 shows the performance comparison of each
scheme in terms of the resource utilization in IoT sys-
tems. In this work, the resource utilization is a measure
of how IoT system bandwidth is used. To maximize the
network performance, bandwidth utilization is an im-
portant performance metric. During system operations,
all the schemes produce similar resource usability. How-
ever, the resource utilization produced by our proposed
scheme is higher than other schemes from low to heavy
service request rates.
In Fig. 3, the comparison of normalized system
throughput is presented. In this paper, system through-
put is defined as the normalized data amount of a suc-
cessfully service. In general, the better throughput gain
means that the system can achieve the higher profit in
IoT operation. Due to the inclusion of selfishness and
social welfare tradeoff mechanism, the proposed scheme
can keep the higher system throughput during the IoT
system operations.
The curves in Fig. 4 show the cooperative degree (ε)
status under different Γ values. In this work, ε value indi-
cates the degrees of player’s cooperative behaviors. Ac-
cording to the Γ value, players get the adjusted cost for
services and re-consider their actions. Based on the
feedback-based learning approach, network agents in
our scheme can dynamically adapt the current situation
and adaptively select their strategies. By looking at the
results, we can observe that the proposed scheme fits
well to reach the behavioral equilibrium.
Figure 5 indicates the IoT system fairness of each
scheme. This measure is a key factor to estimate the
fair distribution of system resource. All the schemes
have similar trends. However, our proposed scheme
Fig. 2 Resource utilization in IoT systems
Kim EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:24 Page 9 of 11can achieve a balanced resource allocation for players.
Therefore, we can maintain the excellent system fair-
ness under various service rates. This feature is a
highly desirable property for the multi-agent system
management. The simulation results shown in Figs. 2,
3, 4, and 5 demonstrate the performance comparison
of the proposed scheme and other existing schemes
[5, 11] and verify that our behavioral learning gameFig. 3 Normalized system throughputbased scheme can provide an attractive IoT system
performance.
6 Conclusions
Nowadays, IoT is regarded as a technology and eco-
nomic wave in the global information industry after the
Internet. The IoT is an intelligent network which con-
nects all things to the internet for the purpose of
Fig. 4 Cooperative degree status under different Γ values
Kim EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:24 Page 10 of 11exchanging information and communicating through the
smart objects in accordance with agreed protocols. Re-
cently, IoT communication control problem is analyzed
through both non-cooperative and cooperative game
model to maximize the system performance. In this
paper, we take a new direction to develop a socio-
physical IoT connection algorithm. Based on the behav-
ioral learning game model, the tradeoff between selfish-
ness and public interest in the IoT system is analyzed.Fig. 5 Service fairness in IoT systemsCompared with the existing schemes, simulation result
shows that our proposed scheme helps network agents
to adapt actions to achieve the socially balanced out-
come while converging to behavioral learning equilib-
rium. Future work will be pursued in the following
directions. Theoretical analysis needs to be further de-
veloped. Identifying some application domains for em-
pirical studies is also planned. Furthermore, behavioral
game model can be extended toward for other research
Kim EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:24 Page 11 of 11areas: control decisions in inter-process communication,
disk and memory management, file and I/O systems,
CPU scheduling, and distributed operating system.
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